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Abstract 
Electronic election systems are a sensitive application and security is a major concern. This process should be 
ensured to maintain the integrity and confidentiality of the casted votes and voters authentication before they 
casts their votes. Besides security, other issues need to be considered such as; simplicity, reliability, convenience, 
flexibility, mobility and cost. In this paper, an integrated security protocol and a prototype of a web-based 
electronic election system is proposed by integrating two techniques; the first technique is a new zero knowledge 
mutual authentication protocol based on Diffie-Hellman (D-H ZKP) key exchange algorithm, to enforce a 
mutual authentication between the election authority server and the voters and exchange secret key securely. The 
second technique is homomorphic encryption scheme to encrypt all the votes and perform the calculation of the 
votes without revealing any information about it to ensure the secrecy of the votes and maintain the 
confidentiality. The proposed protocol provides secure voting over the Internet and maintains the requirements 
of the election process. 
Keywords: E-election, D-H ZKP, Homomorphic Encryption.  
 
1. Introduction 
Electronic election is the voting process held over electronic media, i.e. computers and information technologies. 
E-election systems can be categorized into two types; voting machines and Internet voting. Voting machines are 
specialized equipment located at election centers. They typically allow the voters to cast their vote easily and to 
process the ballots. On the other hand, Internet voting does not need physical election centers; voters can cast 
their votes using their own devices such as computers, smart devices (phones and tablets). In this paper, we focus 
on Internet voting systems, specifically security issues. 
In election applications, security is one of the major issues, simplicity is another requirement to allow 
wide participation of citizens. With the addition to security and simplicity, such as reliability, convenience, 
flexibility, mobility and cost, need to be considered. In that respect, a well-designed protocol is necessary to 
incorporate all of these requirements. Computers and Internet has been used widely which makes election over 
the Internet a promising solution for many reasons such as; eliminating waiting time, minimizing voting error 
and election fraud [1]. Although advances in network security offer a wide range of protocols to design election 
system with reasonable security, but still carefully designed protocols and enhancements of the applications are 
necessary to protect them from the network threats [2]. 
Two approaches of electronic voting security protocols can be noticed; blind signatures and 
homomorphic encryption. In blind signatures, the voter supplied with a token, "a blindly signed message", 
unknown to anyone except himself. The voter sends his token together with his vote over a secure channel. 
These schemes require voter’s participation in more rounds. In homomorphic encryption, the voter interacts with 
the authority server to encrypt his vote. According to the homomorphic property, the encrypted votes are 
summed and the result of the election is computed after decrypting the sum by the authorities [3]. 
In this paper, a theoretical background of zero-knowledge proof, homomorphic encryption and 
modified Diffie-Hellman algorithm for mutual zero-knowledge is discussed. An integrated security protocol and 
a prototype of secure electronic election system using zero-knowledge with modified D-H algorithm and 
homomorphic encryption is presented with examples. Finally analysis and conclusions of the proposed system is 
discussed. 
 
2. Characteristics of Secure E-Election  
Electronic election system has major properties that should be considered during the design and implementation 
processes of the election system. The following is a main requirements for electronic voting systems that are 
considered in the electronic voting literature [4]:  
2.1 Accuracy: A validate vote should not be possible to altered or eliminated, and it is not possible for an invalid 
vote to be counted in the final tally.  
2.2 Democracy: An election system should allow only eligible voters to vote, and it ensures that each eligible 
voter can vote only once.  
2.3 Privacy: No one (including election authority) can track (link) any ballot to a voter, and no voter can prove 
that he/she voted to specific candidate.  
2.4 Integrity: Votes should not be able to be modified, forged, or deleted without detection. 
2.5 Verifiability: The election system should allow anyone to verify that all votes have been counted correctly.  
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2.6 Convenience: The election system should allow voters to cast their votes quickly, in one session, with 
minimal equipment and skills.  
2.7 Mobility: The election system should be designed with no restrictions (other than logistical ones) on the 
location from which a voter can cast a vote.  
2.8 Other properties might be added according to the nature of the election system such as; reliability, audibility, 
accountability, Transparency, Cost-effectiveness, etc.  
 
3. Zero Knowledge Authentication 
Authentication systems include verifying entities credentials by some authorized server to grant them an access 
to a specific system. Zero-knowledge proof is an authentication system which allows one party to prove to a 
second party via some public information that he possesses some secret information without revealing the secret 
to the second party [5].  
ZKP is used essentially to construct a trusty interaction between two parties (prover and verifier) 
without revealing secret information to prove their identities [6].  
In ZKP system, a prover prove to the verifier that some statement is true by passing public numbers 
about the validity of the assertion and nothing about the secret. In a proof of knowledge, the prover also prove to 
the verifier that he possess a “witness” for the given statement. The interactions between involved parties are 
designed in such a way that the secret information cannot be revealed or guessed. At the end of interaction 
session, the verifier knows that the claimant possesses the secret or not, nothing more. The result of the 
interaction is either accepted or rejected [6].  
 
3.1 Definition of Zero-Knowledge Proof 
"ZKP computation model is defined as an interactive proof system (P,V), where P is a prover and V is a verifier. 
This system is used to prove a statement for a language over {0,1}. Given L a language over {0,1}*, for a 
membership instance x∈L, P and V must share the common input x, Proof instance is denoted as (P,V)(x)" [7]. 
The prover (P) and the verifier (V) exchanges a sequence of proof statements, p1, v1, p2, v2... pn, vn over some 
communication channel. Each element pi, vi exchanged is bounded by polynomial in |y| and proof instance 
(P,V)(y) must terminate in polynomial time in |y|. The prover claims that y∈L. After completion of the 
interaction session, the result should be of form (P,V)(y)∈{Accept, Reject} representing verifier (V) acceptance 
or rejection of  prover (P) claim [8].  
The following properties should be satisfied in ZKP [9, 10]: 
3.1.1 Completeness: if the statement is true, then an honest prover who follows the protocol should be able to 
convince the verifier. 
3.1.2 Soundness: if the statement is false, then any cheating prover (even if it has computationally unbounded 
power) cannot convince the verifier except with very small probability. 
3.1.3 Zero-knowledge: if the statement is true, cheating verifier knows nothing other than the given statement.  
 
3.2 ZKP Protocols 
One of the famous zero-knowledge schemes is Fiat-Shamir identification scheme; which is an interactive zero-
knowledge proof that permits the (prover), to convince the (verifier), that he possesses a secret without disclosing 
the secret. For full description of the scheme refer to [10, 11]. 
The scheme is a probabilistic so that a dishonest claimant has a 50 percent chance of fooling the verifier 
and passing the test (by predicting the value of the challenge) in other words, the verifier assigns a probability of 




 then it is highly improbable that 
the prover can guess 20 times correctly. Unfortunately, decreasing the probability will increase the computation 
cost [12, 13].   
A new ZKP protocol proposed by [14] based on Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange Algorithm (D-H ZKP) 
"in the sense that both parties (the prover and the verifier) exchange non secret information without revealing 
secret information to get one identical secret key" [14].  
Both parties (prover and verifier) exchanges public numbers and calculates shared secret key (Kalice and 
Kbob), hence they can exchange encrypted data using generated key. Using the shared secret key, they encrypt their 
replies (R1 and R2) into (C1 and C2). Encrypted replies is decrypted into (R1' and R2') and compared with the 
original replies (R1 and R2) to verify the claim of the claimant.  At the end of the process both parties can either 
prove their honesty or rejected in a mutual authentication process. The proposed algorithm is deterministic; hence 
there is no soundness error and no chance that a cheating prover can convince the verifier [14].  
The interaction between the prover and the verifier is designed in such a way that passing public 
numbers without revealing their secret numbers using the properties of discreet logarithm to generate shared 
secret key. Replies are encrypted by one side and decrypted by other side using shared secret key to avoid man-
in-the-middle-attack and prove mutual authentication. A slight enhancement has been made on the protocol to 
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reduce unnecessary processing. For more detail refer to the original protocol in [14]. Table-1 states the protocol. 
Figure-1 illustrates D-H ZKP protocol diagram.  
 





Figure 1. Modified Diffie-Hellman ZKP protocol [14] 
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4. Homomorphic Encryption 
Homomorphic encryption schemes are cryptographic constructions which enable to securely perform operations 
on encrypted data without ever decrypting them, which is of great importance because of its wide and growing 
range of applications such as; cloud computing, e-voting, and information retrieval. In homomorphic encryption, 
the sum of two encrypted values is equal to the encrypted sum of the values. Homomorphic property is useful in 
e-voting applications in the sense that the sum of a group of encrypted values (votes) is verified and counted 
without revealing their contents [15].  
"The encryption algorithm E() is homomorphic if; given E(x) and E(y), one can obtain E(x ⊥ y) without 
decrypting x and y for some operation (⊥)", the homomorphic property can be represented by the following 
equation [15, 16]:  
Ek(m1) ⊥ Ek(m2) = Ek(m1 ⊥ m2)         …………………    (1) 
Where; Ek represents the encryption done on messages m1 and m2 with some key k. Ek(m1) ⊥ Ek(m2), is a 
calculation in a group G, whereas Ek(m1 ⊥ m2) is a calculation in a group H. The `⊥', is a group operator 
corresponding to each group, and may be different for G and H.  
The homomorphic property offers counting and verifying the votes without revealing the individual votes. After 
the election, the encrypted votes are accumulated into single, encrypted, sums. The election authorities then 
decrypt the resulting sums to obtain final results. According to the homomorphic property, these sums should be 
equal to the sums of the decrypted individual votes. Accordingly, counting the votes is done without learning the 
individual values of the votes. [17].  
The operation (⊥) could be multiplication (*) and/or addition (+). Fully homomorphic cryptosystem support 
additive and multiplicative homomorphism (i. e. ⊥ = * and +). The first such system is a lattice-based 
cryptosystem developed by Craig Gentry in 2009 [15]. Gentry's Ph.D. thesis [17], provides additional details. 
Fully homomorphic crypto systems are considered powerful systems in the sense that it could be run by an 
untrusted party without revealing its inputs and internal state. However, fully homomorphic schemes suffer from 
sharp increasing of computational time while increasing level of security. To obtain 2k (k is an integer from 
some range of candidates) security level, the ciphertext and computation time are high-degree polynomials in k 
[18, 19]. 
Partial homomorphic cryptosystem using either additive or multiplicative homomorphism. Some examples of 
partially homomorphic cryptosystems are; RSA and ElGamal which they are inhabit a multiplicative 
homomorphism. RSA algorithm uses multiplicative homomorphic encryption such that; given ci = E(mi) = mi
e
 
mod N; then for two plain information m1, m2 and their ciphers c1, c2, we can write [20]: 
c1 = m1
e
 mod N 
c2 = m2
e
 mod N  




mod N = (m1 . m2)
e
 mod N    
Where; c cipher message, m plaintext, e encryption key, and N modulo.   
Another partial homomorphic schemes which uses addition operation only (+) such as Paillier [15]. The 
homomorphic property is preserved such that;  
Ek(m1) + Ek(m2) = Ek(m1 + m2)      …………..     (2) 
Where, Ek represents the encryption done on messages m1 and m2 with some key k. Ek(m1) + Ek(m2), is a 
calculation in a group G, whereas Ek(m1 + m2) is a calculation in a group H. In partially homomorphic schemes, 
the homomorphic property is preserved and works as follows; votes are encrypted individually as they enters and 
added together to form summation counters for each candidate [21]. At the end of the election, the encrypted 
summation is decrypted to reveal the final results of the votes. Hence, no one can relate the votes to their voters. 
Partially homomorphic scheme is implemented in this research to maintain efficiency in terms of time and space 
[22, 23].  
Figure-2 illustrates bulletin board in (a) regular plaintext votes and (b) in homographic encryption form.  Using 
additive homomorphic property, only numbers in row of totals are decrypted, hence maintain votes privacy.  
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Figure 2. Bulletin Board  a. Regular  b. With Homomorphic Encryption 
 
5. Integrated E-Election Protocol  
The proposed protocol is a hybrid cryptographic algorithm which makes use of the benefits of both 
cryptographic approaches. It uses public key scheme for authentication and secure key exchange, and symmetric 
cryptographic scheme for encryption. The protocol assumes that the voters and candidates are registered in 
databases; voter database (DBv) and candidates database (DBc) respectively by election authority. The protocol 
comprises of four stages; voter validation stage, authentication stage, voting stage and election results stage. 
Figure-3 illustrates the proposed protocol. Stages are described as follows: 
5.1 Stage I: Voter Validation Stage: In the voter validation stage, the voter starts by sending a request to the 
server asking for permission to vote, the server check the eligibility of the voter by searching voter database 
(DBv) and make his decision to allow or reject the request. Stage I consists of steps 1-3 of the protocol 
shown below. 
5.2 Stage II: Authentication Stage: Authentication stage consists of two parts; part one (stage II-A) authenticate 
server to voter and part two (stage II-B) authenticate voter to server. Both parts uses modified Diffie-
Hellman protocol (D-H ZKP), described in table-1 above to perform mutual authentication and exchange 
shared secret key. In this stage the process may terminates if any party appears dishonest. By the end of this 
stage, if not terminates; voter proved legible, both server and voter are proved honest and server sends 
candidates list to voter.  Stage II consists of steps 4-8 of the protocol shown below. 
5.3 Stage III: Voting Stage: In voting stage, the voter receives candidates list from the server, submit his ballot 
and transmit it to the server. The server encrypts the ballot homomorphically using homomorphic 
encryption scheme discussed in section 4. Stage III consists of steps 9-13 of the protocol shown below. 
5.4 Stage IV: Election Results: At the end of the election time announced by the election authority, the 
administrator performs homomorphic encryption on the ballots database and calculates the summation of 
votes for each candidate. Stage IV consists of step 14 of the protocol shown below. 
5.5  proposed protocol  
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b:    
CDi:    
D-H ZKP: 
DBv:  
DBc:     
DBb:    
E( ):     
IDv:     
Ks:    
Mi:    






Modified Diffie Hellman protocol for Zero-Knowledge proof 
Voter Database  
Candidates Database  
Ballots Database 
Homomorphic Encryption  
Voter Identification No.   
Shared Secret Key  
Error Messages 
Server Public Key  
Server Private Key  
Server 
Voter 
Seq. From/to Activity 
Stage I: Voter Validation Stage  
1 V Generate public keys (p, g), secret key (x), calculate R1= g
x
 mod p 
2 V  S Request for voting (IDv, p, g, R1) 
3 S Check voter eligibility using voter database (DBv); if not, terminate with message (M1), 
else continue 
Stage II-A: Server Authentication Stage 
4 S Generate secret key (y), calculate; K = (R1)
y
 mod p, R2 = g
y
 mod p, and C1 = E(K, R2) 
5 S  V Sends (R2 || C1) to voter 
6 V Server Authentication; Calculates K = (R2)
x
 mod p, decrypt (R2' = D(K, C1)) and verify 
(R2 = R2') . If they matched; then proceeds, otherwise terminate with message (M2) 
(dishonest verifier) 
Stage II-B: Voter Authentication 
7 V  S Encrypt (C2 = E(K, R1||R2) and send it to  server 
8 S Voter Authentication; Decrypt C2 to get R1' and R2', (R1' = D(K, C2) verify (R1 = R1') ; 
If they matched then; proceeds, otherwise terminate with message (M3) (dishonest 
prover)  
Stage III: Voting Stage 
9 S V Send candidates list (CDn) from candidates database (DBc), public key (PUs) 
10 V  S Submit vote, validate vote if not valid; return with message (M4) 
11 V  S Encrypt vote and transmit to server E(PUs, CD1), E(PUs, CD2), …, E(PUs, CDn) 
12 S Store votes in Ballot database (DBb)  
13 S  V Send receipt of vote  to voter (M5) 
Stage IV: Election Results 
14 A S If end of election, perform homomorphic encryption of ballots E(PUs, CD1), E(PUs, 







Voter is not found in the database or not legible to vote  
Server is not authenticated (dishonest) 
Voter is not authenticated (dishonest) 
Invalid vote  
Vote has been recorded successfully  
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Figure 3. Integrated security Protocol for E-Election System 
 
6. System Design 
The three tiered architecture has been chosen to implement the proposed system to allow a central server 
location for all the application logic, database, which allows reuse, consistency, flexibility to potential changes 
and uniformity of applications in this environment. The three-tiered layering facilitates some of design and 
development problems, easy and efficient development work [24]. 
The three tiers are: the client interface tier (The presentation layer which supports the graphical user 
interface (GUI)), the application logic tier which performs business rules and logic of the application, and the 
database tier.  
The interface layer in the proposed system offers the voter an easy and convenient entry to interact with 
the system and cast his vote. The application logic tier controls functions interaction, messages exchange and 
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manipulating of information flows. Finally, the data management is performed by the database layer, which store, 
manage and retrieve information needed for the application [24, 25]. Figure-4 illustrates the architecture of the 























Figure 4. Secure E-Election System Architecture 
 
6.1 Client Interface Layer 
The client interface layer is used to facilitate the interaction between the clients with the application and manage 
the input/output data. The clients gain access to the application by using any existing web browser software. The 
client interface layer contains all required functions to receive data from the client, passing it to the logic layer 
and display information received from the logic layer (sending requests and receiving replies). Clients of the 
application are voters and administrator, as they described below. 
6.1.1 Voter 
Voter has mainly a user interface which communicates with application layer. The voter is supposed to enter his 
name and National Identification Number (NIDN) that has been previously delivered to him through election 
authority offices together with his randomly generated secrete number in a sealed card. The National 
Identification Number entered by the voter is compared with the stored national number in the database. Invalid 
name or national number will be rejected and a second chance for the voter will be given. Valid data will lead 
the voter to second stage.  
The voter enters his secret number and communicates with the election authority server (honest verifier) 
through D-H ZKP protocol to establish a secure mutual authentication and prove to each other that they are 
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illegible and honest. Figure-5 illustrates communication screen between voter and the server. Additional 
information such as; (R1, R2, K) has been showed in the screen for test purposes. On successful completion of 
this step, candidate names are dynamically retrieved from the candidates database (DBc) and displayed to the 
voter. The user has an option to log out or cast his vote. If the voter completes the vote, the (has voted) field in 
voters database (DBv) is updated so that the user cannot log in once more.  
 
 
Figure 5. Voter-Server Authentication Communication Screen 
6.1.2 Administrator  
Administrator has a special username and password to login to the system. After he/she has logged into the 
system, he will get new screen which allow him to add, update or delete voters or candidates. At the end of 
election, the administrator can perform homomorphic encryption and calculate the results of the election. 
Administrator screen is shown in figure-6. 
 
Figure 6. Administrator Screen 
 
6.2 Application Logic Layer 
The application logic layer is the middle layer, which connect the user interfaces and the underlying database, 
hiding technical details from the users. Modules in this layer receive clients request from the interface layer and 
perform appropriate function. Application logic layer consists of a control module and three functional modules. 
The control module controls the flow of execution and transferring required information between them and the 
database layer. Figure-7 illustrates control module flowchart. The functional modules are;  
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Figure 7. Control Module Flowchart 
6.2.1 ZKP Authentication Module 
Each voter must be authenticated through zero knowledge proof, using D-H ZKP protocol discussed earlier in 
section (3.2). A claimant (voter) and the verifier (server) will interact and communicating messages to prove to 
each other that they are illegible. During this process a secret key is generated in both sides securely. After 
exchanging messages, the voter will be either accepted and proceeds to the voting stage, or rejected and halt the 
system. 
6.2.2 Voting Module 
Voting module is designed to conduct the process of voting. Authenticated voter can selects his candidates in 
his/her region from a pull down menu and cast his vote. The votes will be transmitted to the server, encrypted 
and stored in the database using homomorphic module. 
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6.2.3  Homomorphic Module 
Homomorphic encryption module is used to encrypt the votes and storing them in the database as illustrated in 
figure-8. In this module the sum of a group of encrypted votes is verified without revealing those encrypted votes 
using homomorphic module, after all the voting procedure completes. Homomorphic protocol is discussed in 
section (4). 
At the end of the election process, this module will be executed again to process the votes and calculate 
the results homomorphically (i. e. using the homomorphic properties) to produce the final election results.  
 
Figure 8. Encrypted Votes Table 
 
6.3 Database Layer 
The database layer is used to store and retrieve application data according to the instructions of the application 
logic. Data can be processed and stored back in the database.  
In this application the database consists of three tables. The first table called “Voter Database (DBv)”, which 
stores the voter's data. Second table called "Candidate Database (DBc)" used to store the candidates data. The 
third table called "Ballots Database DBb)" used to store encrypted votes as illustrated in figure-8 above.  
 
7. System Analysis 
In this paper, two techniques have been used to design and implement an integrated security protocol for 
electronic election system and maintain its requirements. The first technique is a new zero knowledge protocol 
used to ensure secure mutual authentication between the voter "prover" and the election authority server 
"verifier" with the addition to exchange key securely. This technique is used to ensure that both parties are legal 
and hence prevent election fraud and maintain democracy which allows legal voters to vote once only. This 
technique has been proved theoretically and during the implementation test.  
The second technique is homomorphic encryption protocol which ensures the confidentiality of the 
votes, in the sense that no one can relate any vote to a specific voter, besides, voter can't prove the way that 
he/she voted. Homomorphic properties have been proved throughout the related literatures.  
The proposed e-election system prevents incomplete ballots and hence can be easily verified by 
comparing total voters with total votes as it appears in the final report of the system.  
The proposed system is a web-based application and hence it is flexible and mobile which help voters to 
cast their vote from any location that they can cast their vote with minimal skills and no restrictions.  
With the addition to the previous characteristics, the system provides reasonable reduction in the 
monetary cost, effort, and time required compared with traditional election systems. 
 
8. Conclusions 
This paper presents the design and implementation of an integrated security protocol for electronic election 
system assuming that voters and candidates has been already registered in an electronic databases. The proposed 
system consists of four stages; the first stage is voter validation stage to ensure his eligibility to vote. Second 
stage is to authenticate voters and election authority mutually with high level of security. In these phases, the 
system assures of security properties such as; authentication, trust, transparency, eligibility, and privacy. 
The third stage is the voting stage, which is based on homomorphic cryptography techniques through 
which privacy and confidentiality are maintained. The fourth stage is the results stage, it consists of two steps; 
counting and auditing, which counts and audit the votes of each candidate. In this stage, homomorphic properties 
are applied to assure accuracy, verifiability, reliability, and fairness. 
Other election requirements, Convenience, flexibility and mobility are also maintained throughout the 
design of the system using flexible three-tier web based architecture.  
We conclude that the proposed system has met security requirements while maintaining electronic 
election properties.  
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